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Mandating Rule 11 Sanctions?
Here We Go Again!
Edward D. Cavanagh*
Abstract

The House of Representatives has passed H.R. 720, a bill that
would amend Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by
re-instituting mandatory sanctions for Rule 11 violations and essentially
restoring Rule 11 to its contents under the 1983 amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The legislation would mandate
imposition of monetary sanctions and eliminate any restrictions on
when a Rule 11 motion could be filed. The bill would thus scuttle the
1993 Amendments, which (1) entrusted the sanctions decision to the
sound discretion of the trial court; (2) provided a 21-day safe harbor
period that barred the filing of any sanctions motion until 21 days after
the Rule 11 motion had been served; and (3) required that the sanction
imposed be fashioned so as to deter future Rule 11 transgressions.
Accordingly, H.R. 720 would deny trial courts leeway both in deciding
whether to impose sanctions and in designing the sanction in a given
case.
This article argues that: (1) the case for re-instituting mandatory
sanctions has not been made, and the drafters of the bill point to no
developments in federal civil litigation during the past 25 years that call
for mandatory sanctions under Rule 11; (2) mandatory sanctions are
counterproductive in that they serve to increase costs, lead to delays in
resolution of cases, and create a hostile litigation environment; (3)
mandatory sanctions are fundamentally unfair; and (4) any changes in
Rule 11 are best made through rule-making rather than legislation. In
the end, mandatory sanctions create more problems than they solve.
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Introduction

The House of Representatives has passed H.R. 720, the
Litigation Abuse Reduction Act of 2017, which essentially
restores Rule 11 to its content prior to the 1993
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1
Specifically, the bill (1) makes sanctions mandatory where a
Rule 11 violation has been found; (2) eliminates the 21-day
safe harbor period that allowed an offending party to correct
or withdraw a “challenged paper, claim, defense, contention,
or denial,”2 once a sanctions motion had been served by an
adversary; and (3) mandates the imposition of monetary

See Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2017, H.R. 720, 115th § 16
(detailing the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11).
2.
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2).
1
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sanctions where Rule 11 violations have been found.3
The new bill would thus eliminate the discretion that
courts now possess under the 1993 Amendments in deciding
whether to impose sanctions.4 Equally important, by
mandating the imposition of monetary sanctions,5 the new
bill robs the courts of any leeway in fashioning the remedy
for particular Rule 11 violations. Under both the 1983 and
1993 versions of Rule 11, courts had broad discretion in
determining the appropriate penalties for a Rule 11
transgression.6 The 1983 Amendments did not identify
compensation as an underlying goal of the sanction process,
but fee-shifting quickly became the sanction of choice in
Rule 11 cases.7
The 1993 (and current) version of Rule 11 does authorize
fee-shifting as a sanction.8 The current rule makes clear,
however, that deterrence—not compensation—is the end
goal of the sanctioning process and that any sanctions
imposed under Rule 11 “must be limited to what suffices to
deter the repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by
others similarly situated.”9 To that end, the current rule
also specifically authorizes non-monetary sanctions, as well
3.
See Lawsuit Abuse Act of 2017 (strengthening the sanction process for
Rule 11 violations).
4.
Compare Lawsuit Abuse Act of 2017 (mandating sanctions), with Fed.
R. Civ. Pro. 11(c)(1), (4) (“[T]he court may impose an appropriate sanction . . . .
The sanction may include nonmonetary directives; an order to pay a penalty
into court; or . . . an order directing payment . . . of the reasonable attorney's
fees and other expenses directly resulting from the violation.” (emphasis
added)).
5.
Lawsuit Abuse Act of 2017.
6.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s notes to 1983 amendments
(stating that “the court should have the discretion to impose sanctions”).
7.
See N.Y. State Bar Ass’n., Report of the Special Committee to Consider
Sanctions for Frivolous Litigation in State Courts, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 5
(1990) (recommending fee-shifting as the appropriate sanction of choice).
8.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2), (4) (allowing shifting of reasonable
attorney’s fees).
9.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4) (emphasis added).
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as monetary penalties payable to the court.10 In mandating
monetary sanctions as compensation to a party aggrieved by
a Rule 11 violation, H.R. 720 breaks new ground and goes
far beyond the 1983 version of Rule 11 that it purports to
restore.
I.

The Case Against H.R. 720

The re-imposition of mandatory sanctions is a bad idea
and should be rejected for the following reasons: (1) there is
no demonstrated need to turn back the clock and re-adopt
mandating sanctions;11 (2) mandatory sanctions are
counterproductive and harmful to the litigation process;12
(3) mandatory sanctions are fundamentally unfair and
would create the same problems that the 1993 Amendments
sought to resolve;13 and (4) mandatory sanctions undermine
the role of the judiciary in creating rules of practice and
procedure in the federal courts pursuant to the Rules
Enabling Act.14
A. No Need for Mandatory Sanctions
Proponents of H.R. 720 have not made the case for
re-institution of mandatory sanctions. The current discretionary
standard for Rule 11 sanctions has been in place for nearly a
Id.
See infra notes 15–37 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of
demonstrable need for a change to the current Rule 11 regime).
12.
See infra notes 38–44 and accompanying text (explaining the social
costs and harm to the litigation process that would arise as a result of the
proposed amendments to Rule 11).
13.
See infra notes 45–57 and accompanying text (describing how the
amendment would create the same problems that the 1993 amendment tried to
resolve and continues to resolve).
14.
See infra notes 58–63 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of
unity between the proposed amendments and the text and goals of the Enabling
Act).
10.
11.
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quarter-century.15 Yet, neither the bill nor its accompanying
House Report cites any developments in the federal civil justice
system since 1993 that would warrant a shift from the present
standard.16 Nor does the House Report cite any empirical studies
suggesting that frivolous litigation is on the rise in the federal
courts in recent years.17 Indeed, the record support for H.R. 720 is
so thin as to be almost invisible.
Even assuming that frivolous litigation has been on the
uptick since 1993, there is no factual basis for the assumption
that mandatory sanctions will curb the filing of baseless lawsuits.
The more likely scenario is that introduction of mandatory
sanctions will trigger widespread satellite litigation that will
increase the cost of litigation, delay the ultimate resolution of
cases, and thereby have precisely the opposite result than
intended by the legislation.18 As the Judicial Conference of the
United States has observed:
The facts do not support any assumption that
mandatory sanctions deter frivolous filings. A
decade of experience with the 1983 mandatory
sanctions demonstrated that it failed to provide
meaningful relief from the litigation behavior it was
meant to address, and instead generated wasteful
satellite litigation that had little to do with the
merits of cases. The 1983 version of Rule 11 required
sanctions for every violation of the rule, and quickly
became a tool of abuse. Aggressive filings of Rule 11
sanctions motions required expenditure of
15.
Rule 11 as it currently stands has remained as written since the 1993
amendments. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s notes to the 1993
amendments (providing the language for the current rule).
16.
See Lawsuit Reduction Act of 2017, H.R. 720, 115th Cong. § 16 (making
no mention of developments that would warrant a change to Rule 11 as
previously stated).
17.
See id. (making not reference to a rise in frivolous litigations).
18.
See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LETTER TO BOB GOODLATTE 1–4 (2015),
https://www.afj.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Judicial-Conference-Letter.pdf
(objecting to the 2015 proposed amendments of H.R. 758).
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tremendous resources on Rule 11 battles having
nothing to do with the merits of the case and
everything to do with strategic gamesmanship.
Many Rule 11 motions in turn triggered countermotions seeking Rule 11 sanctions as a penalty for
filing of the original Rule 11 motion.19

Similarly, the American Bar Association has challenged the
assumption that mandatory sanctions would deter baseless
litigation, noting that “it is more likely that problems have abated
because Rule 11’s safe harbor provides an incentive to withdraw
frivolous filings at the outset of litigation.”20
The case for mandatory sanctions set forth in the House
Report is unpersuasive. The “facts” relied on are ancient; the
most recent “data” are from 2005 and most of the cited materials
are over 20 years old.21 Some is anecdotal; none addresses the
federal civil justice system as it functions today.22 The House
Report also cites to studies describing judges attitudes towards
sanctions rather than the efficacy of mandatory sanctions.23
Heavy reliance is placed on Justice Scalia’s dissent at the time
the Supreme Court promulgated amended Rule 11 in 1993.24
Essentially, Justice Scalia argued two points. First, he
asserted that federal civil justice system had been functioning
effectively under a mandatory sanctions regime and that
therefore no change was needed.25 Further, he asserted that
Id. at 1–2.
See SUSMAN, ABA URGES YOU TO OPPOSE PASSAGE OF H.R. 720, THE
LAWSUIT ABUSE REDUCTION ACT 2 (2017), http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/HR%20720_March%202017.authcheckdam.pdf
(objecting to H.R. 720).
21.
See H.R. REP. NO. 115-16, at 1–3 (2017) (explaining the need for H.R.
720).
22.
See id. (providing outdated data).
23.
See id. at 3 (“In 1990 . . . an overwhelming majority of Federal judges
believed that Rule 11 did not impede the development of the law (95%) . . . .”).
24.
See id. at 4 (citing J. Scalia’s “strongly worded dissent on the Rule 11
changes”).
25.
See SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURES AND FORMS, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 401, 509 (1993) (“I
19.
20.
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mandatory sanctions under Rule 11 had successfully deterred
baseless litigation without creating significant satellite
litigation.26 He also cited a Federal Judicial Center study that
had concluded that “80 percent of district judges believe that Rule
11 has had an overall positive effect and should be retained in its
present form, 95 percent believe the rule has not impeded
development of the law, and about 75 percent said the benefits
justify the expenditure of judicial time.”27 Of course, how federal
judges viewed the impact and efficacy of mandatory sanctions in
1993 is largely irrelevant as to whether mandatory sanctions are
needed in 2017. Moreover, Justice Scalia’s view on the impact of
mandatory sanctions is at odds with the findings of the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules that led to the abnegation of
mandatory sanctions.28
Second, Justice Scalia argued that the 1993 Amendments
would again make Rule 11 a paper tiger as it was prior in 1983,
urging that the amendments would make Rule 11 “toothless, by
allowing judges to dispense with sanctions, by disfavoring
compensation for litigation expenses and by providing 21-day safe
harbor within which, if the party accused of a frivolous filing
withdraws the filing, he is entitled to escape with no sanctions at
all.”29 The second argument, like the first, is unavailing. First,
introduction of discretionary sanctions does not eliminate the
courts’ power to address baseless litigation; it simply provides
district judges flexibility to treat alleged Rule 11 transgressions

would not have registered this dissent if there were convincing indication that
the current Rule 11 regime is ineffective, or encourages excessive satellite
litigation. But there appears to be general agreement, reflected in a recent
report of the advisory committee itself, that Rule 11, as written, basically
works.”) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).
26.
See id. at 509–10 (“[T]he overwhelming approval of the Rule by the
federal district judges who daily grapple with the problem of litigation abuse is
enough to persuade me that it should not be gutted as the proposed revision
suggests.”).
27.
Id. at 509.
28.
See id. at 523 (“The Advisory Committee is unanimous that, to the
extent these changes may be viewed as ‘weakening’ the rule, they are
nevertheless desirable.”).
29.
Id. at 507–08.
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on a case by case basis.30 Second, if the real problem is that
judges are willing to tolerate frivolous lawsuits, then sanctions,
whether mandatory or discretionary, will have little real-world
effect on baseless litigation.
Third, deterrence of baseless litigation—not compensation
to victims—is the proper goal of Rule 11 sanctions.31 Scalia’s view
that compensation trumps deterrence—and H.R. 720’s language
mandating monetary sanctions—create perverse incentives for
alleged victims of frivolous lawsuits to extend actions and run up
large legal bills (which offending party would be forced to pay),
instead of moving to dismiss the offending claim at the earliest
opportunity.32
Fourth, the 21-day safe harbor provision is a mechanism
that affords an offending party one last opportunity to stop and
think before it decides to move the litigation forward and perhaps
thereby obviating the need for judicial intervention.33 The safe
harbor is not, as Justice Scalia suggests, an open invitation to
engage in abuse of process.34 Indeed, the American Bar
Association has reached an opposite conclusion, “it is more likely
that problems have abated because Rule 11’s safe harbor provides

30.
See Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2017, H.R. 720, 115th Cong. § 16
(granting judges discretion in Rule 11 sanctions).
31.
See supra note 9 and accompanying text (stating that deterrence is the
goal of Rule 11 sanctions).
32.
See SUSMAN, supra note 20 (“[P]ast experience strongly suggests that
the proposed changes would encourage new litigation over sanction motions,
thereby increasing, not reducing, court costs and delays. This is a costly and
completely avoidable outcome.”)
33.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s notes to 1983 amendments
(“Under the former rule, parties were sometimes reluctant to abandon a
questionable contention lest that be viewed as evidence of a violation of Rule 11;
under the revision, the timely withdrawal of a contention will protect a party
against a motion for sanctions.”).
34.
See SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURES AND FORMS, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 401, 508 (1993) (“To
take the last first: In my view, those who file frivolous suits and pleadings
should have no ‘safe harbor.’ The Rules should be solicitous of the abused (the
courts and the opposing party), and not of the abuser.”).
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an incentive to withdraw frivolous filings at the outset of
litigation.”35
Fifth, perhaps the strongest reason for rejecting Justice
Scalia’s position is that the parade of horribles that he envisioned
in the wake of the adoption of the 1993 Amendments simply has
not materialized. Sanctions filings have declined significantly
compared to pre-1993 levels but without any discernible trend in
the filing of baseless lawsuits.36 This is not to say that frivolous
lawsuits are never filed. Rather, the post-1993 sanctions
experience clearly demonstrates that discretionary sanctions do
not aid and abet baseless litigation.37
B. Mandatory Sanctions Are Counterproductive
Mandatory sanctions come at a cost, and that cost outweighs
any perceived benefits.38
1. Litigation Costs
Mandatory sanctions will increase—not decrease—litigation
costs. The decade of experience under the 1983 version of Rule 11
amply demonstrates that mandatory sanctions promote satellite
litigation on the issue of whether Rule 11 has been violated.39
Rule 11 motions take time and cost money to prepare, litigate,
and adjudicate. These motions thus add to the overall costs of
litigation and delay the resolution of a given controversy on the

SUSMAN, supra note 20, at 2.
See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 18, at 3 (“The amended Rule has produced
a marked decline in Rule 11 satellite litigation without any noticeable increase
in frivolous filings.”).
37.
See id. at 3–4 (detailing a list of findings from a survey of the Federal
Judicial Center that demonstrates that discretionary sanctions are, generally,
working and desirable).
38.
See infra notes 39–44 (demonstrating various social costs to the
proposed amendments to Rule 11).
39.
See id. at 3 (“The Advisory Committee concluded that Rule 11’s costshifting provision created an incentive for too many unnecessary Rule 11
motions.”)
35.
36.
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merits.40 Rule 11 motions also deflect the court’s attention from
the substantive law issues before it.
2. Toxicity of Rule 11 Motions
Rule 11 motions interject an element of toxicity into judicial
litigation that tends to undermine both collegiality and respect
for the court.41 Once a Rule 11 motion is made, incentives among
adversaries to cooperate, or even behave civilly, diminish
significantly; that, in itself, can impede the progress of the
litigation.42 Parties may cease communication directly with each
other and speak through the court. Once this happens, parties dig
in and meaningful settlement discussions become impossible.43
Moreover, sanctions motions undermine the court’s essential role
as a neutral umpire.44 No matter how the court rules on a
sanctions motion, it will have offended one or both parties.

40.
See SUSMAN, supra note 20, at 1 (By enacting H.R. 720, “”Congress
incurs the substantial risk that the proposed changes will harm litigants by
encouraging additional litigation and increasing court costs and delays.”).
41.
See Sam Glover, Dealing with Rule 11 Threats and Motions,
Lawyerist.com, https://lawyerist.com/66663/dealing-with-rule-11-threats-andmotions/ (last visited May 15, 2017) (discussing the issues surrounding Rule 11
threats and motions) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
42.
See generally id.
43.
See SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURES AND FORMS, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 401, 592 (1993)
(“Parties settling a case should not be subsequently faced with an unexpected
order from the court leading to monetary sanctions that might have affected
their willingness to settle or voluntarily dismiss a case.”).
44.
See 46 AM. JUR. 2D Judges § 129 (2009) (“There is a strong presumption
that judges are impartial participants in the legal process . . . . The law
presumes that a judge is unbiased and unprejudiced.”).

MANDATING RULE 11 SANCTIONS? HERE WE GO AGAIN!

41

C. H.R. 720 Would Create The Same Problems That Arose
Under The 1983 Version Of Rule 11
The House Bill would raise—and not address—the very same
problems that led the Supreme Court to eliminate mandatory
sanctions through the 1993 Amendments to Rule 11.45
1. Perverse Incentives
By mandating monetary penalties for Rule 11 violations
through fee shifting, H.R. 720 would re-introduce the profit
motive into Rule 11 proceedings.46 In a perfect world, defense
counsel, faced with a lawsuit that it deems baseless, would
immediately contact plaintiff’s counsel, raise the Rule 11
concerns, and seek consensual dismissal of the action. Under H.R.
720, however, defense counsel is strongly encouraged to seek its
attorney’s fees as a remedy for a Rule 11 infraction.47 Rather than
move for immediate dismissal of the purportedly baseless claim,
defense counsel has a strong incentive to invest substantial time
and effort in defending the meritless action by conducting
extensive (and costly) discovery eventually leading to a summary
judgment motion.48 That additional work, leads to higher legal
fees and hence stiffer sanctions.
To eliminate this strategic behavior, the 1993 amendments
made clear that deterrence—not compensation—was the goal of

45.
See infra notes 46–57 and accompanying text (discussing how the
amendment would create the same problems that the 1993 amendment tried to
resolve and continues to resolve).
46.
See SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURES AND FORMS, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 401, 592 (1993)
(discussing the changes of the 1993 amendment, which is designed to reduce
“fee-shifting”).
47.
See id. at 524–25 (“[For] the expenses incurred in presenting or
opposing a Rule 11 motion, the published draft provides the court with
discretion to award fees to the prevailing party: this is needed to discourage
non-meritorious Rule 11 motions without creating a disincentive to the
presentation of motions that should be filed.”)
48.
See supra note 32 and accompanying text (predicting increase in Rule
11 motions and costs and delays associated with them).
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the sanctions process.49 Although the 1993 Amendments still
permit fee-shifting, that practice is discouraged.50 More
importantly, H.R. 720, by mandating monetary sanctions, goes
way beyond restoring Rule 11 to its pre-1993 status. The 1983
version of Rule 11 was silent on the issue of monetary sanctions
and, as noted, was unclear as to whether compensation should
even be a goal of the sanctions process.51 H.R. 720 is thus a
marked departure from Rule 11 as promulgated in 1983, which
left remedies for Rule 11 violations to the sound discretion of the
court.
2. Chilling Meritorious Litigation
Another lesson of history lost on the drafters of H.R. 720 is
that mandatory sanctions are likely to over deter to the point of
chilling meritorious lawsuits.52 Although Rule 11 is both
transsubstantive and party neutral, some studies on the
implementation of the 1983 amendments suggested that
sanctions motions may well be deterring legitimate civil rights
actions.53 Mandatory monetary sanctions would deter lawsuits
that advocate novel positions, at odds with existing law. There is
little reason to believe that this pattern will not re-emerge if H.R.
720 becomes law.

See supra note 9 and accompanying text (stating that deterrence is the
primary aim of Rule 11 sanctions).
50.
SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURES AND FORMS, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 401, 592 (1993).
51.
See supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing the role of
discretion in the issuing of sanctions.)
52.
See N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, supra note 7, at 7–8 (expressing concern
about a chilling effect in access to the courts without actually solving the
problem of frivolity in filings).
53.
See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Report of the Third Circuit Task
Force on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11: An Update, 19 SETON HALL L. REV.
511, 521–23 (1989) (discussing the disparate effect on civil rights plaintiffs
arising from Rule 11 motions).
49.
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3. Will Mandatory Sanctions Be Uniformly Administered?
In theory, mandating sanctions would promote uniformity of
Rule 11 enforcement standards and lessen uncertainty that
arguably exists in a discretionary regime.54 Again, history
suggests the opposite conclusion. Under the 1983 version of Rule
11, sanctions were not uniformly implemented. Some judges were
outspoken critics of Rule 11 and refused to impose sanctions.55
Others were “sanctioning judges” who were willing, if not eager,
to impose Rule 11 sanctions.56 Thus, the decision as to whether or
not to impose sanctions would turn on the attitude of individual
judges toward sanctions rather than the wording of Rule 11
itself.57 Again, there is no guarantee that amending Rule 11 will
change the attitudes of judges toward mandatory sanctions.
More importantly, piling mandatory monetary penalties on
top of mandatory sanctions robs judges of flexibility to address
problems on a case by case basis. The cookie cutter approach of
H.R. 720 has a surface appearance of fairness but may produce
unduly harsh results in individual cases. Moreover, H.R. 720 may
encourage bully tactics by deep-pocket defendants against
impecunious plaintiffs.
D. Case Law Developments Make Mandatory Sanctions
Unnecessary
Judicial decisions since the 1993 Amendments make
mandatory sanctions unnecessary. In Twombly,58 the Supreme
Court raised the bar for pleadings in federal court and made it
easier for courts to toss cases at the motion to dismiss stage. The
Court in Twombly recognized the burden imposed on litigants by
See SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES
in 146 F.R.D. 401, 508 (1993)
(explaining the issues with the discretionary powers when granted to judges).
55.
See N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, supra note 7, at 8 (describing the concerns
surrounding arbitrary punishment).
56.
See id. (discussing “sanctioning judges”).
57.
See id. (detailing the type of judges who impose sanctions).
58.
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 566 (2007)
54.

OF CIVIL PROCEDURES AND FORMS, reprinted
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costly discovery.59 The court urged district judges to be sensitive
to the high cost of discovery and assigned district judges the role
of gatekeeper to assure the only plausible claims are permitted to
move onto the discovery process.60 Although Twombly was
controversial when decided in 2007, both courts and litigants
have become comfortable with its holding.61 Courts are no longer
hesitant to dismiss claims at the pleading stage.62 In the
post-Twombly world, the notion that baseless cases are infecting
federal dockets throughout the country and forcing defendants to
incur needless and costly discovery is without factual support.63
E. H.R. 720 is An Unwise Intrusion By Congress
Unquestionably, Congress has the power to create rules of
practice and procedure in the federal courts. Under the Rules
Enabling Act,64 Congress shares this power with the Supreme
Court, which may promulgate rules of practice and procedure in
the federal courts, subject to Congressional veto. Rule 11 in all of
its iterations was adopted by the Supreme Court pursuant to the
rulemaking process.65 That fact does not bar Congress from
acting on Rule 11, but that course would be imprudent.

See id. at 557–58 (recognizing the extreme costs of litigation generally).
See id. at 558-59 (recognizing the need to stop frivolous cases before
discovery).
61.
See William H.J. Hubbard, The Effects of Twombly and Iqbal (U. of
Chicago, Public Law Working Paper 591, 2017) (“[T]here is evidence that
lawyers changed their pleading and motion practice in the wake of those
cases.”).
62
See generally id. (showing the adjustments made to Twombly in the
legal world since the decision).
63.
See supra notes 15–37 and accompanying text (discussing the
deficiencies in the House Report reasoning for the need for change to Rule 11).
64.
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012).
65.
See SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURES AND FORMS, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 401, 405 (1993) (“[The
Court is] authorized to transmit to the Congress the foregoing amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in accordance with the provisions of Section
2072 of Title 28, United States Code.”).
59.
60.
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First, Rule 11 is a vehicle for policing the conduct of attorneys
and their clients in federal court on a day-to-day basis.66 This is
no small task. Judges are far better situated than legislators to
determine on a daily basis whether or not litigants are
prosecuting frivolous claims or asserting baseless defenses
designed to frustrate the fundamental goals of the Federal Rules
“to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination” of
claims and defenses in federal court.67 In particular, judges are
best positioned to understand all the nuances of litigation and to
decide on a case-by-case basis whether attorneys or their clients
have violated Rule 11.68 Accordingly, Congress should leave both
the substance of Rule 11 and its enforcement to the courts.
Second, H.R. 720, in imposing mandatory monetary penalties,
goes far beyond its 1983 predecessor.69 This more ambitious rule
seems aimed not only at limiting baseless litigation but also at
limiting litigation generally. Rather than implement Rule 11 as a
vehicle for litigation reform, Congress might identify the areas of
substantive law in need of reform and address this area
specifically as it has done in the securities area. Mandatory
sanctions on top of such targeted reform efforts are legislative
overkill.
II.

Conclusion

The Senate should not act on this bill. There is no
demonstrated need for mandatory sanctions, and prior experience
in a mandatory sanctions regime has demonstrated that
mandatory sanctions create more problems than they solve.
66.
See id. (“These rules govern the procedure in the United States district
courts in all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in
equity or in admiralty . . . . They shall be construed and administered to secure
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.”)
67.
FED. R. CIV. P. 1
68.
See WILLIAM G. YOUNG, JOHN R. POLLETS, & CHRISTOPHER POREDA, 19
MASS. PRAC., EVIDENCE § 102.1 (3d ed.) (“In civil litigation . . . the judge is thrust
into the ongoing discussions between the parties and obtains a great deal of his
information about the case from his exercise of the mediating role.”).
69.
See supra notes 6 and 53 and accompanying text (discussing the nature
of the proposed amendments to Rule 11 in contrast with Rule 11 as it existed
prior to 1993).
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